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Momentum seemed to be escalating in early 2014 for the passage of a 
comprehensive reform package of the housing finance system in the U.S., but that 
was not to be, as neither political party fully supported its passage, derailing the 
progress made over the previous few years.  
While consensus around the primary features of reform 
has grown, new research that questions these assump-
tions needs to be addressed and the inertia keeping the 
country mired in the current, uncertain system needs to 
be overcome. In this brief, we will discuss the progress 
made thus far en route to reform, analyze the disparate 
elements of the leading proposals, and incorporate new 
findings that will shape the additional research that 
must be done before policymakers can agree on the best 
path forward.
THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Freddie Mac)—both known as government 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—are the vehicles in 
the United States for creating a secondary market for 
residential mortgages and for providing liquidity to 
that market. They purchase conforming mortgages from 
lenders—primarily single-family, 30-year fixed rate 
mortgages that have not been insured by the federal 
SUMMARY
• The U.S. government’s open-ended assistance in the housing 
industry is not a feasible long-term strategy for economic growth, 
and ending the current conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac is fundamental to any housing finance reform measure.
•  Several points of consensus for reform have emerged, including: 
preserving the 30-year fixed rate mortgage and the market for 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS); ordering private capital in a 
first-loss position with a government guarantee to protect only 
against catastrophic outcomes; creating a common securitization 
platform (CSP) to provide transparency and liquidity; and providing 
for affordable housing directives.
•  New research from the Federal Reserve, which proposes that 
a catastrophic risk insurance premium be added on top of the 
other new costs of reform, also demands consideration.
•  This brief breaks down several leading reform proposals and 
contains an in-depth analysis of the Johnson-Crapo Housing 
Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 and its 
possible effects on mortgage rates.
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government—in order to allow lend-
ers to make more loans to borrowers. 
They then maintain these purchased 
loans in their own portfolios or, more 
often than not, package them into 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
which they sell to investors. The fees 
charged to investors for guarantee-
ing payment on the MBS are a major 
source of income for Fannie and 
Freddie.1 Prior to 2008, both GSEs 
were private companies that had these 
same responsibilities, although Con-
gress created them at different times. 
But as a consequence of the finan-
cial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were 
placed under the conservatorship of 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) on September 7, 2008. 
Under the regulation of the FHFA, 
they collectively received $180 billion 
in assistance, which they subsequently 
repaid in full, and they have gone on 
to earn profits in recent years. Despite 
these facts, they remain in conserva-
torship and the system of insuring 
mortgages in the U.S. continues to 
rely on the open-ended assistance of 
the federal government. 
 
POINTS OF CONSENSUS FOR 
SECURITIZATION REFORM IN 
EARLY 2015
After much economic and legislative 
debate in Congress, a number of key 
requirements have emerged that likely 
will be present in any reform proposal 
which moves the country away from 
the current system. The first require-
ment is the acknowledgment that the 
30-year fixed rate mortgage is still 
the principal mortgage product in 
the United States. Historically, most 
banks have swapped the mortgages 
they originated for GSE mortgage-
backed securities into the secondary 
market to decrease their risk exposure. 
The preservation of the TBA (To-
Be-Announced) Market for MBS is 
necessary to support the liquidity of 
this market and to help ensure the 
continued existence of the 30-year 
fixed rate mortgage.2
The second requirement appear-
ing as a point of consensus is that 
private capital should be located in a 
first-loss position to absorb downturns 
in the MBS market, with the govern-
ment providing a guarantee behind 
that first-loss position to insure only 
against catastrophic outcomes. A Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC)-like fund supported by guar-
antee fees (g-fees) could provide this 
catastrophic government guarantee. 
Up front private capital could shield 
taxpayers from having to pay for bail-
outs in the event of another financial 
crisis, but disagreements abound as to 
the level and the make-up of private 
capital necessary in this first-loss posi-
tion. We will analyze the consequences 
of differing estimates below.
Third, a common securitization 
platform (CSP) is the best way of 
ensuring transparency and liquidity 
and maintaining oversight of credit 
standards in the MBS market. There 
is continuing debate as to whether 
there should be one security or more, 
especially given the likely continu-
ance of the GNMA security which 
insures the timely payment of pools of 
100% government-guaranteed FHA/
VA mortgages. In any case, this utility 
would set loan origination, servicing, 
pooling, and securitization standards. 
Last, affordable housing should, in 
some way, be addressed in any reform. 
An important choice is whether 
affordable housing will become the 
primary responsibility of the FHA, or 
whether affordable housing mandates 
should also be imposed on any system 
designed to replace Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.3 Failing to add afford-
able housing directives will exacerbate 
 1 Currently, guarantee fees roughly equal portfolio income in 
Fannie Mae’s single family market and account for about 
80% of portfolio income in its multifamily market. Guaran-
tee fees are an even larger income source for Freddie Mac. 
See: http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/
quarterly-annual-results/2014/10k_2014.pdf and http://
www.freddiemac.com/investors/er/pdf/10k_021915.pdf.
 2  For a further discussion on the TBA Market, see Akash 
Kanojia and Meghan Grant. “Preserving the TBA Market.” 
Forthcoming.
 3  For a further discussion on FHA, see Kevin A. Park and Ro-
berto G. Quercia’s “The Once and Future Federal Housing 
Administration.” Forthcoming.
 4  Diana Hancock, and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mort-
gage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
 5  Delaney, Carney, and Himes Introduce Housing Finance 
Reform Legislation. http://delaney.house.gov/news/press-
releases/delaney-carney-and-himes-introduce-housing-
finance-reform-legislation
 6  Patricia C. Mosser, Joseph Tracy, and Joshua Wright. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Capital and 
Governance of a Mortgage Securitization Utility.” January 
2015.
 7  Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics, 
“Housing Finance Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
 8  Fannie Mae, “Summary of Issues, Johnson-Crapo Discus-
sion.” April 2014.
 9  Freddie Mac, “Analysis of Johnson-Crapo Discussion.” 
March 2014.
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10 Akash Kanojia and Meghan Grant. “Preserving the TBA 
Market.” Forthcoming.
11 For a further discussion on the difficulties of correctly 
pricing risk for mortgage securities, see Levitin, Adam J., 
and Susan M. Wachter. “Explaining the Housing Bubble.” 
Georgetown Law Journal 100.4 (2012): 1177-1258. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669401
12 For a further discussion on how the lack of availability in 
the mortgage market causes economic and regulatory 
problems, see Levitin, Adam J., and Susan M. Wachter. 
“Second-Liens and the Leverage Option.” U of Penn, Inst 
for Law & Econ Research Paper Forthcoming (2015). 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2556687
13 Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics, 
“Housing Finance Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
14 Fannie Mae, “Summary of Issues, Johnson-Crapo Discus-
sion.” April 2014.
15 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: S. 1217 
Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 
2014.” May 2014. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
s1217_0.pdf
16 Laurie Goodman, Jim Parrott, and Ellen Seidman. Urban 
Institute, “A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue.” July 2014.
17 Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mort-
gage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
18 Patricia C. Mosser, Joseph Tracy, and Joshua Wright. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, “The Capital and Gover-
nance of a Mortgage Securitization Utility.” January 2015.
19 Clifford V. Rossi. Chesapeake Risk Advisors, LLC, “Forging 
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risk-based pricing and lead to less 
cross-subsidization which, in turn, 
may make loans prohibitively expen-
sive to people in underserved commu-
nities and may lead to procyclicality 
in these markets and in the overall 
housing finance market, as discussed 
below. 
This is the current state of the 
dialogue surrounding reform, but 
new findings from researchers at 
the Federal Reserve indicate that 
these requirements alone may not be 
enough to stave off future bailouts 
of failing financial institutions. They 
suggest that all mortgages, whether 
securitized privately or through a 
GSE-like program, should be insured 
against catastrophic risk.4 
EXISTING PROPOSALS
The aforementioned points of consen-
sus that developed over the last several 
years stem from various proposals 
offered in Congress. The option we 
will consider in depth is the Johnson-
Crapo Housing Finance Reform and 
Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, and 
we will compare this to two other 
options: a cooperative, as suggested by 
NY Federal Reserve Bank researchers, 
and a reformed, privatized Fannie and 
Freddie system, as suggested by vari-
ous groups of existing shareholders of 
the remaining outstanding common 
and preferred stock of those compa-
nies. We also will consider the impli-
cations of the recent Federal Reserve 
research on catastrophic risk insurance 
in the housing finance system. 
It does warrant mentioning, how-
ever, that other significant propos-
als exist. The first is the Protecting 
American Taxpayers and Homeown-
ers (PATH) Act, which the House 
Committee on Financial Services 
approved in 2013 and calls for phas-
ing out the GSEs, marginalizing the 
role of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA), and establishing a 
non-profit National Mortgage Market 
Utility. This Utility would not be able 
to guarantee mortgages, but would 
set loan origination, servicing, pool-
ing, and securitization standards. The 
second proposal is the Partnership 
to Strengthen Homeownership Act, 
introduced in the House in July 2014 
by Representatives John K. Delaney 
(D-MD), John Carney (D-DE), and 
Jim Himes (D-CT). This bill would 
replace the GSEs with an insurance 
program established through Ginnie 
Mae. It calls for a 5% private capi-
tal shield in a first-loss position and 
stipulates that the remaining 95% 
of the risk be shared between Gin-
nie Mae and a private reinsurer on a 
pari passu basis.5 In this proposal, the 
government guarantee is fully priced 
in the market and there is no effec-
tive backstop. Even though in theory 
this model should provide market 
discipline, mortgage guarantors can 
go out of business. It therefore raises 
the question of whether lending will 
remain robust in times of market 
stress.6 
THE JOHNSON-CRAPO 
OPTION
Bipartisan legislation introduced by 
Senators Tim Johnson (D-SD) and 
Mike Crapo (R-ID) built upon previ-
ous legislation offered by Senators 
Bob Corker (R-TN) and Mark War-
ner (D-VA) and attempted to coalesce 
each reform requirement under a 
single bill. Johnson-Crapo creates 
the FDIC-like Federal Mortgage 
Insurance Corporation (FMIC) that 
would serve as the regulator respon-
sible for oversight of the mortgage 
insuring, securitizing, and servicing 
processes. The FMIC would provide 
an explicit government backstop for 
eligible MBS, thus codifying the 
implicit guarantee historically pro-
vided by Fannie and Freddie, both of 
which would be phased out under this 
4
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legislation and replaced by similarly 
funded aggregators. It would fur-
ther create and regulate a new CSP 
focused on preserving the 30-year 
fixed rate mortgage.7
The Johnson-Crapo bill man-
dates a 10% private capital shield 
in a first-loss position in order for 
financial institutions to qualify for the 
government guarantee, but predic-
tions of the bill’s overall effects on 
mortgage rates vary widely depending 
on who is doing the estimating. The 
FHFA required Fannie and Freddie 
to provide estimates on how Johnson-
Crapo would affect mortgage rates, 
which we analyze in Table 1.8, 9 We 
also consider estimates put forth by 
Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis 
of Moody’s Analytics. Each of the 
three organizations presents different 
scenarios, which we group together by 
how they allocate the cost of guaran-
tors’ capital. How policymakers decide 
which forms of capital will make 
up the 10% buffer remains an open 
question, but the categories in Table 1 
(Rigid vs. Flexible Capital Structures) 
illustrate that defining these features 
of the bill can lead to large disparities 
in the cost of capital and, ultimately, 
in mortgage rates. Comparing the 
three estimates of the Rigid Capital 
Structure is difficult because each 
a Path out of Conservatorship for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.” October 2014.
20 This path would also include the use of credit risk transfer 
securities, such as Fannie Mae’s Connecticut Avenue 
Securities and Freddie Mac’s STACR debt. For more infor-
mation, see Treasury official Michael Stegman’s remarks. 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl9987.aspx
21 For a further discussion on credit in the housing market, 
see Wachter, Susan M., “Credit Supply and Housing Prices 
in National and Local Markets.” (2014). http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2508029
22 Laurie Goodman, Jim Parrott, and Ellen Seidman. Urban 
Institute, “A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue.” July 2014.
23 Another difference between the reform options so far 
discussed is that there would be less vertical integration 
in the revamped Fannie and Freddie system as they would 
continue not originating loans. A potential shortcoming 
that poses a “Too Big to Fail” risk under Johnson-Crapo 
is that the bill allows for financial institutions to be both 
guarantors and originators, though momentum has pushed 
policymakers away from this idea. See: Mark Zandi, and 
Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics, “Housing Finance 
Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
24 Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mort-
gage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
25 For a further discussion, see Wachter, Susan. “The Market 
Structure of Securitization and the US housing bubble.” 
National Institute Economic Review 230.1 (2014): R34-
NOTES
TABLE 1: ASSUMED MORTGAGE RATES UNDER JOHNSON-CRAPO
April 2014 (no. in basis points) 
Rigid Capital Structure a	 Moody’s		 b		 Fannie Mae  g Freddie Mac
Guarantee fee  128  146  205
 Cost of capital (10% private in first-loss position)  86  116  160
  Common equity 4% 76 5% 77 7% 148
  Preferred equity 0% 0 5% 39 7% 0
  Debt or risk syndication 6% 18 0% 0 3% 12
  Present value of future guarantee fees 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
  Less: Return on cash reserves to pay for losses  -8  –  –
 Administrative costs  10  10  9
 Expected losses  10  5  8
 Mortgage Insurance Fund  10  5  15
 Market Access Fund  10  10  13
Yield on Mortgage Securities  335  330  335
Servicing and Origination Compensation  50  50  50
Assumed Mortgage Rate  511  526  590
Flexible Capital Structure d	 Moody’s		 e		 Fannie Mae  z Freddie Mac
Guarantee fee  109  100  83
 Cost of capital (10% private in first-loss position)  69  70  62
  Common equity 3% 57 3% 46 4% 50
  Preferred equity 1% 11 3% 23 1% 6
  Debt or risk syndication 3% 9 0% 0 4% 6
  Present value of future guarantee fees 3% 0 4% 0 1% 0
  Less: Return on cash reserves to pay for losses  -8  –  –
 Administrative costs  10  10  6
 Expected losses  10  5  3
 Mortgage Insurance Fund  10  5  5
 Market Access Fund  10  10  7
Yield on Mortgage Securities  335  350  325
Servicing and Origination Compensation  50  50  50
Assumed Mortgage Rate  494  480  458
a	= Moody’s “Strict Interpretation” d	= Moody’s “Liberal Interpretation”
b	= Fannie Mae’s “Model Fee with Preferred Equity” e	= Fannie Mae’s “Model Fee with Future Fees + Preferred Equity”
g	= Freddie Mac’s “High Cost Scenario” z	= Freddie Mac’s “Low Cost Scenario” 
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organization presents very different 
capital breakdowns. What they have 
in common, however, is that each 
allows the use of only two distinct 
forms of capital (i.e., specific equity 
and debt instruments) and none allow 
for the inclusion of the present value 
of future g-fees to count towards the 
10% threshold. The Flexible Capital 
Structure does allow for the inclusion 
of future g-fees and has no restrictions 
on how the 10% is composed.
Another open question is the 10% 
level itself. Both Moody’s and the 
Urban Institute’s analyses find that 
a 4-5% private capital buffer would 
have been sufficient for Fannie and 
Freddie to withstand the crisis begun 
in 2007 (note: the actual level the 
GSEs maintained both at that time 
and now is closer to 1%). They each 
question the need for such a high 
level of private capital in a first-loss 
position because they assume a high 
quality book of business with underly-
ing mortgages meeting basic qualified 
mortgage standards, which is already 
a requirement under Johnson-Crapo. 
Furthermore, the GSEs and Ginnie 
Mae currently impose strict guidelines 
on which mortgages are eligible for 
securitization.10 Recent analysis from 
Diana Hancock and Wayne Pass-
more of the Federal Reserve suggests 
that private capitalization of more 
than 15% may be required to avoid a 
future government intervention, but 
the depth of the need for capital and 
the cyclicality depends in the end on 
underwriting over the cycle, and the 
sheer lack of availability of informa-
tion about potential mortgage losses 
accounts for the uncertainty surround-
ing these estimates.11, 12
Other factors that lead to con-
flicting estimates of mortgage rates 
under Johnson-Crapo are differ-
ent return assumptions and varying 
estimations of the cost of the Market 
Access Fund. The Market Access 
Fund noted in Table 1 is shorthand, 
referring to both a newly created 
fund of the same name that would be 
charged with overseeing the creation 
of responsible lending products for 
underserved communities, as well as a 
new Housing Trust Fund that would 
be required to ensure the availability 
of quality housing.13 These funds are 
merely incentives to provide access for 
housing and are a departure from the 
current system whereby the two GSEs 
have specific affordable housing goals.
IMPLICATIONS OF 
MORTGAGE RATE ESTIMATES
According to Fannie Mae, whose 
guarantee fee was 47 basis points 
(bp) in April 2014 (i.e., the same 
timeframe as Table 1), the average 
mortgage rate was 447bp.14 There-
fore, under Johnson-Crapo, mortgage 
rates could rise by anywhere from 
64 to 143bp, or 14-32%, under the 
Rigid Capital Structure. Moody’s 
simulated a 50bp increase in fixed 
mortgage rates and, after three years 
(beginning retroactively in January 
2014), it determined that the home-
ownership rate would be about 0.1% 
lower, with annual home sales lower 
by approximately 250,000 units and 
housing starts down by over 100,000 
units. Further analysis appears war-
ranted, given a potential rise in fixed 
mortgage rates of about three times 
the size simulated by Moody’s. What 
effect would this have on homebuy-
ers, especially first-time buyers, and 
on the economy as a whole, if higher 
rates lead to fewer sales and decreased 
homeownership? 
Another unknown is the effect 
Johnson-Crapo would have on the 
federal budget. Static projections 
from the CBO estimate that enacting 
Johnson-Crapo would decrease federal 
deficits by $58 billion over the 2015-
2024 decade.15 The CBO predicts a 
$60 billion drop in direct spending, 
as new FMIC fees would exceed the 
R44. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508030
26 Clifford V. Rossi. Chesapeake Risk Advisors, LLC, “Forging 
a Path out of Conservatorship for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.” October 2014.
NOTES
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cost of guarantees, and revenue would 
drop slightly since the FHFA would 
no longer assess GSE fees. But there 
is also an equity component that the 
CBO fails to account for. A move 
away from the current system likely 
would decrease the federal govern-
ment’s equity ownership in and 
income from the GSEs. Additionally, 
such a shift in the housing finance 
landscape could alter the behavior of 
mortgage issuers in less straightfor-
ward ways. Therefore, budget-scoring 
Johnson-Crapo, taking into account 
additional estimates, and discovering 
the second order effects of reform that 
might make moving away from the 
status quo more (or less) economi-
cally attractive could provide helpful 
insight.16 
Furthermore, how stable is 
Johnson-Crapo over the business 
cycle? This procyclicality question is 
key for the overall advisability of the 
legislation, of course, as well as for 
an evaluation of how estimates of the 
cost of capital change over time.17 
Policymakers have yet to seek answers 
to these questions.
THE COOPERATIVE 
ALTERNATIVE
Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy and 
Joshua Wright, researchers at the 
NY Federal Reserve Bank, separately 
offer the proposal of a lender-owned 
cooperative that both securitizes and 
guarantees standardized mortgage 
products through a mutualized securi-
tization utility. Since the utility would 
have an in-house insurance function, 
the cooperative would be incented to 
maintain credit standards and decrease 
excessive risk taking.18 It is argued 
that a mutualized ownership structure 
could prevent deterioration in under-
writing, rather than relying solely on 
regulation to accomplish this end. To 
support robustness and availability of 
securitization through the cycle, the 
utility is required to purchase govern-
ment reinsurance against systemic 
credit events for whole vintages of 
mortgage securities. The vintage-
based capital structure could mitigate 
the procyclicality of mortgage credit, 
thus reducing the private capital 
requirement far below the 15% level 
presented by Hancock and Passmore 
and even below the 10% level stated 
in Johnson-Crapo. In contrast to 
institution-level reinsurance, vintage-
level reinsurance would help maintain 
investors’ and issuers’ incentives to 
continue participating in the utility, 
thereby facilitating business continu-
ity through a crisis and subsequent 
recovery.
REFORMING FANNIE AND 
FREDDIE
A phase-out of the GSEs will be 
costly, take a long time (potentially 
more than the five years stated in 
Johnson-Crapo given the size of the 
enterprises and the complexities of 
their operations), and leave room for 
hiccups in the MBS market during 
the transition. Reforming Fannie 
and Freddie by obtaining sufficient 
up front private capital to bolster 
the infrastructure already in place is 
another alternative to Johnson-Crapo, 
especially considering the inertia of 
the current system. The GSEs’ infra-
structure will be needed regardless in 
order to create the CSP, which the 
FHFA is already beginning to develop 
under the joint ownership of Fannie 
and Freddie. With recapitalized GSEs 
with far larger capital requirements, 
sufficient to protect the government 
against all but catastrophic losses, 
the argument is that there is no need 
to manage risk by explicitly pricing 
the premium provided by the GSEs’ 
implicit government guarantee. But 
a true reform of the current system 
means that the GSEs would have to 
be permitted to exit conservatorship 
after demonstrating that they can 
meet minimum regulatory capital 
requirements—a daunting task that 
could take up to five years itself.19 
Additionally, they would have to wind 
down their retained portfolios, the 
government guarantee would have 
to be addressed, and the question 
of “who owns the system?” must be 
answered. 
In the absence of phasing out or 
reprivatizing Fannie and Freddie, 
there remains the option to continue 
along the current path of develop-
ing a CSP and a common security, 
which the government would stand 
behind.20, 21 Not only does this raise 
the question of whether or not to 
merge Fannie’s and Freddie’s opera-
tions, but also whether the U.S. should 
de facto nationalize the housing 
finance system. 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE COST OF CREDIT
This political question about the 
government’s role in the housing 
market will inform the direction 
of legislation, but the answer to 
this question hinges upon a further 
question: what is the goal of 
housing finance reform generally? 
7
Cross-subsidization of loans has 
been a GSE practice, but Johnson-
Crapo’s flexible incentive fee is its 
only form of cross subsidy. Absent 
other mandates, private capital in 
a first-loss position—one of the 
widely acknowledged requirements 
of reform—will lead to risk-based 
pricing, which will have implications 
for the procyclicality of the 
housing finance system as well as 
the sustainability of an affordable 
housing mandate.22, 23 
There also remains the question of 
how much private capital in a first-
loss position is really needed, which 
we return to now.
THE CATASTROPHIC RISK 
INSURANCE CONDITION
New research from the Federal 
Reserve suggests, as other research-
ers have previously hypothesized, that 
the combination of the private sector 
first-loss capital requirement and 
expectations of government bailouts in 
the event of a catastrophe would make 
government-sponsored securitization 
less competitive than private securi-
tization during economic upswings. 
The options above are subject to this 
crowding out in an expansion phase 
of the cycle. A surprising new finding 
from a simulation analysis posits that, 
despite these generally agreed upon 
requirements of reform, all mortgages 
regardless of securitization (private 
vs. government) may need to be 
insured against catastrophic risk—an 
additional TRIA-like requirement. 
The researchers suggest that a mort-
gage insurance premium should be 
added on top of the other new costs 
of reform (namely, the capital costs 
associated with the private sector first-
loss position and the increased g-fees 
designed to cover catastrophic default 
losses) because these costs are poten-
tially insufficient and leave taxpayers 
exposed during a catastrophic eco-
nomic event.24, 25 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER 
ANALYSIS
Housing markets, investors, and bor-
rowers have joined the GSEs in limbo 
over the last six years.26 Ending the 
conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie 
is fundamental to any housing finance 
reform measure. Political issues aside, 
there are still unknowns that should 
be explored which would help shed 
light on whether a Johnson-Crapo-
like path would be more or less advis-
able than an overhauling of the GSEs. 
As discussed above, one unknown is 
the stability of Johnson-Crapo over 
the business cycle. Another unknown 
entails budget-scoring Johnson-
Crapo. But while these recommenda-
tions for further analysis are useful, 
nothing can take the place of political 
will. The United States government’s 
open-ended assistance in the housing 
industry is not a feasible long-term 
strategy.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
ABOUT THE PENN WHARTON  
PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE
The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative 
(PPI) is a hub for research and education, 
engaging faculty and students across 
University of Pennsylvania and reaching 
government decision-makers through inde-
pendent, practical, timely, and nonpartisan 
policy briefs. With offices both at Penn and 
in Washington, DC, the Initiative provides 
comprehensive research, coverage, and 
analysis, anticipating key policy issues on 
the horizon. 
ABOUT PENN WHARTON PUBLIC 
POLICY INITIATIVE ISSUE BRIEFS
Penn Wharton PPI publishes issue briefs at 
least once a month, tackling issues that are 
varied but share one common thread: they 
are central to the economic health of the 
nation and the American people. These Issue 
Briefs are nonpartisan, knowledge-driven 
documents written by Wharton and Penn 
faculty in their specific areas of expertise.
CONTACT THE PENN WHARTON  
PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE
At Penn
Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Room 3012
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302
+1.215.898.1197
In Washington, DC
1350 I (“Eye”) Street, NW, Suite 1270
Washington, DC 20005
+1.202.503.3772
For additional copies, please visit the Penn Wharton PPI website at publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu.
Follow us on Twitter:  @PennWharton PPI
Founded in 1881 as the first collegiate business school, the Wharton School of the University of Penn-
sylvania is recognized globally for intellectual leadership and ongoing innovation across every major 
discipline of business education. With a broad global community and one of the most published busi-
ness school faculties, Wharton creates economic and social value around the world. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
SUSAN M. WACHTER, PhD
Professor of Real Estate and Finance, The Wharton School
Susan M. Wachter is Albert Sussman Professor of Real Estate 
and Professor of Finance at The Wharton School of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, and Co-Director of the Penn Institute for 
Urban Research. From 1998 to 2001, as Assistant Secretary for 
Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Wachter served as the senior urban 
policy official and Principal Advisor to the Secretary on overall 
HUD policies and programs. At The Wharton School, she was 
Chairperson of the Real Estate Department and Professor of Real 
Estate and Finance from July 1997 until her 1998 appointment to 
HUD. She founded and currently serves as Director of Wharton’s 
Geographical Information Systems Lab. Previously, Wachter 
served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Beneficial 
Corporation from 1985 to 1998 and of the MIG Residential 
REIT from 1994 to 1998. She was the editor of Real Estate Eco-
nomics from 1997 to 1999 and currently serves on the editorial 
boards of several real estate journals. Wachter has been a member 
of the Advanced Studies Institute of the Homer Hoyt Institute 
since 1989. She co-founded and is Co-Director of the Penn 
Institute for Urban Research. She is the author of more than 
150 scholarly publications and the recipient of several awards for 
teaching excellence at The Wharton School.
